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Abstract
Federal and state policy makers have turned to health planning programs as a means to
rationalize the delivery of health care services in the United States for over three decades. Early federal
initiatives such as the Comprehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 and the Health Planning and
Resource Development Act of 1974 were widely criticized for their inability to control costs effectively
or to increase the efficiency of health services delivery. The design and implementation of the federal
government's latest entry into health planning, the Trauma Care System Planning and Development Act
of 1990 (Pub.L. 101-590), suggests that federal and state officials are poised to repeat the mistakes which
plagued previous planning programs. The implementation of Pub. L. 101-590 illustrates the dilemmas
that federal and state officials must confront in achieving effective representation and assuring active
participation in the planning process. Successful regional and statewide planning ventures must devise
strategies to overcome the inherent collective action problems associated with cooperative solutions to
underserved populations. Contemporary approaches to health planning, however, are based upon a
number of questionable assumptions. The creation of new institutional structures merely shifts the venue
for existing conflicts among health providers, third party insurers, and other participants in the health
policy making process to a new arena. In addition to examining possible alternatives for improving
current trauma system planning initiatives, I present a new paradigm for designing and implementing
state and federal planning programs.
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The demise of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (Pub. L. 93-641) in
1986 signalled the end of two decades of federal involvement in state and local health planning. Within
five years, however, the federal government was back in the planning business, albeit on a smaller scale,
with the passage of the Trauma Care System Planning and Development Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-590).
While health planning--either as a voluntary or a mandatory process--has a powerful appeal to federal
and state policy makers seeking to control the rising cost of health care and improve the quality of
services offered by health providers, the federal government's latest venture into health planning
threatens to repeat the mistakes of the past. In contrast to more intrusive forms of regulation, planning
programs promise to rationalize the delivery of health care services by forging consensus among
providers, payers, and public representatives over the appropriate goals for the health care system.
However, unless federal and state policy makers are able to grapple with the inherent contradictions
sown within Pub. L. 101-590, the prospects for successfully implementing federal health planning
programs appear no brighter today than in the 1970s.
Because state trauma system planning programs seek to address a number of shortcomings in the
present U. S. health care delivery system, they offer an instructive case study of the prospects for
effective state level health care reform. Trauma system planners have adopted an "inclusive" approach to
improving the quality of care provided to injured patients by developing strategies for overcoming
problems of access, cost, and variations in the quality of services. Trauma system planning raises
fundamental questions of access, particularly for patients without health insurance or for those who live
in rural areas far from the nearest hospital. Furthermore, since trauma centers must provide treatment to
all injured patients brought through their doors, they have become a focal point for current concerns
about caring for the uninsured, for trauma patients are more likely to lack health insurance coverage
(particularly in urban areas) than non-trauma admissions. Finally, since not all hospitals are equipped to
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care for severely injured patients, trauma system planning has emphasized the benefits of regionalization;
by transporting injured patients to those facilities best equipped to care for them, it is argued,
regionalization can improve both the quality of care and control health care costs by eliminating the need
for expensive services and facilities at hospitals which are not participating trauma centers. Since the
issues involved in trauma system planning raise a number of financing and organizational questions, the
success or failure of these planning efforts can tell us a great deal about the ability of states to tackle
health care reform. If states cannot implement reform in a narrowly defined arena where clear national
standards are present, how likely are they to serve as engines of more comprehensive reform?
Health Planning as a Political Problem
The popularity of planning programs as the solution to the dilemmas of cost, quality, and access
stems from a belief that although the U.S. health care system remains fundamentally sound, inefficiencies
in the organization and financing of care could be improved through careful application of rational
planning and technical expertise. State and federal planning legislation in the 1960s and 1970s reflected
policy makers' belief that careful study of relevant data and broad participation from the community
would identify inefficiencies in the delivery of health care. Furthermore, the development of
comprehensive state and local plans would provide rational alternatives for changing the behavior of
health providers and reorganizing the delivery of health services to control costs, improve the quality of
services, and improve access to care for underserved groups.1 Health planning programs also presented
policy makers with an opportunity to address growing concerns about the U.S. health care system without
significantly interfering in the practice of medicine, for early federal initiatives "sought to organize away
profound American dilemmas without the use of systematic state power."2
By the early 1970s there was a widespread recognition that neither doctors, hospitals, nor
patients had an incentive to restrict utilization of hospital services as long as health providers were
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reimbursed in full for the cost of patient care on a fee for service basis. Doctors and hospitals could, in
essence, increase the demand for hospital services by their choice of treatments or diagnostic
procedures.3 Patients, for their part, were insulated from the true cost of their treatment by extensive
hospital insurance coverage.4 Beginning in the late 1960s, states responded to rising utilization and
health care costs with programs designed to restrict the growth of hospital facilities, in the expectation
that "a bed not built is a bed not used."5
Government regulation of the hospital industry increased markedly during the 1970s after the
passage of the Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-641) established
more than 200 federally funded local health planning agencies. While physicians and hospital
administrators may have been unaccustomed to dealing with federal and state governments on such
matters, health planners were primarily thorns in providers' sides whose actions did not threaten
hospitals' long-term financial health or profitability. The most critical decisions which affected the level
of reimbursement for hospital services remained beyond the scope of planners' jurisdiction. Furthermore,
"physicians, and more relevantly, hospital administrators, quickly discovered that the planning system
could be outmaneuvered. The system was not much of an obstacle once the consultants were called in to
advise."6
The new planning agencies were unpopular with providers and ineffective at controlling costs,
for planners lacked the authority to impose effective sanctions upon hospitals. 7 Even their supporters
acknowledged that the new agencies were beset by multiple (and often conflicting) goals, lacked the
requisite authority to pursue these goals, and offered budding planners few incentives to engage in trench
warfare with local hospitals.8 Proponents of planning expected the development of state and local
planning documents to build a consensus for change based upon technical expertise and grassroots
participation. In practice, however, health planning bore little resemblance to a rational approach to
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resource allocation, as interested parties clamored for seats on state and local advisory boards to protect
their own interests. Consensus proved to be an elusive, if not impossible goal.
Much of the controversy surrounding the federal health planning initiatives of the 1970s
stemmed from heated debates over who would sit on the advisory boards of the new planning agencies.
In the end, the process of planning took a back seat to conflicts over representation, for the 1974 enabling
legislation mandated that a majority of each state or regional planning body be comprised of
"consumers" (e.g., nonproviders). Agencies were required to assemble boards who were broadly
representative of the "social, economic, linguistic, and racial populations, geographic areas of the health
service area, and major purchasers of health care" in the surrounding community. In state after state,
disaffected participants, or those who felt under-represented, claimed that the selection process was
unfair and fought for seats on state and local boards in the courts.9
During the 1980s, health planning fell victim to a changing ideological climate that favored
competitive rather than regulatory solutions. The Reagan administration's hostility towards health
planning led to the demise of the federally funded state planning infrastructure after the expiration of
Pub. L. 93-641 in 1986.10 In addition, twelve states repealed existing certificate of need programs
established during the 1970s to review health providers' proposed capital expenditures. By the end of the
decade, however, health planning had returned to the federal policy agenda as surgeons, emergency
physicians, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and other allied health providers pressed for
Congressional action to reduce the number of deaths from unintentional injuries in the United States.
The result was ironic--after more than a decade of chafing under the restrictions imposed by federally
funded health systems planning, many health providers (particularly surgeons and administrators of
urban trauma centers)now clamored for a new federal planning initiative to rationalize the delivery of
health care services for critically injured patients.
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The Origins and Goals of Trauma System Planning
Advocates for trauma system development and injury prevention programs welcomed federal
intervention despite the shortcomings of federally sponsored health planning initiatives in the 1970s.
Injury was the nation's third leading cause of death during the 1980s, claiming more than 140,000 lives
each year, and injuries were the leading cause of death among persons aged 1-44.11 While injuries have
long been regarded as "accidents," new studies in the 1970s and 1980s suggested that many injury-related
deaths could be prevented by developing an organized and rational approach for treating injured
patients.12 Contemporary trauma care systems trace their origins to new techniques for caring for injured
soldiers on the battlefields of Korea and Vietnam. Rapid access to definitive surgical care at mobile
army surgical hospital (MASH) units and the refinement of prehospital care techniques significantly
reduced U.S. military casualties in both wars. This experience led to calls for the development of similar
organized systems to care for treating patients in the U.S., where injury had been dubbed the "neglected
disease of modern society" by the National Academy of Sciences in the 1960s.13 By the 1970s, many in
the medical community believed that the lessons learned on the battlefield about the effectiveness of
triage, rapid transport of injured patients, and the standardization of lifesaving techniques for use by
medical personnel in remote areas could be applied to the treatment of persons injured in motor vehicle
collisions, falls, and other unintentional injuries in the U.S. Although the passage of highway safety
legislation by Congress provided an impetus for many communities to improve the quality of local
emergency medical care and trauma services, the development of local trauma systems varied greatly
within states and communities.
Trauma centers proliferated during the 1970s, as many hospitals regarded trauma patients as a
source of both profitable patients and institutional prestige. Under the prevailing method of retrospective,
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cost-based reimbursement, health providers had an incentive to treat more "expensive" and difficult
cases, for their costs would be fully reimbursed by third-party insurers. Since hospitals compete on the
basis of perceived quality and reputation, rather than price, the development of a trauma center was often
regarded as a means to improve the hospital's image in the community and attract patients. In addition to
the obvious revenue incentives for treating trauma patients, emergency physicians and surgeons at many
teaching hospitals also had a strong professional interest in developing trauma centers, for a greater
volume of patients would provide opportunities for improving their skills and conducting research.
Hospital administrators, for their part, were willing to accommodate the desires of their medical staffs,
for "the group of attending physicians on the hospital's staff enjoys de facto control of the hospital at any
point in time" as a result of their monopoly over patient referrals.2
By the early 1980s, however, spiralling Medicare and Medicaid costs led to the first significant
change in hospital reimbursement since 1965. Beginning in 1982, for the first time, a significant fraction
of hospitals' revenues were determined on a prospective, rather than a retrospective basis. Under the new
system, federal bureaucrats, not hospital administrators, set reimbursement rates for all inpatient hospital
services, minimizing haggling over "allowable costs." A year later, Congress adopted a new case-based
prospective payment system (PPS) for Medicare amid little debate after a brief four month gestation
period. Within five years, Medicare's new PPS turned the long-established relationships among
providers, payers, and the public upside down. While generous reimbursement rates in the first three
years of PPS led to record profits in the hospital industry, as institutions' operating margin for Medicare
patients exceeded 10 percent from 1984-86, by the late 1980s adjustments to PPS rates lagged well
behind the overall rate of medical inflation.14 15 PPS offered federal officials a powerful weapon to
influence providers' behavior. Since Medicare patients represented the largest component of most
hospitals' charges, institutions were forced to modify their behavior to cope with lower rates of
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reimbursement.16 Medicare reaped considerable savings under the new system as hospitals changed their
behavior to conform to the incentives of a case-based reimbursement system: admissions declined, as did
patients average length of stay.
The changes in Medicare's reimbursement formula had a powerful impact on hospital trauma
centers. Under PPS, payments for inpatient hospital care was based on the average cost of a procedure
among a peer group of hospitals. PPS was designed to promote the efficient use of resources by hospitals,
for if an institution's costs for treating a case were below the peer group average, it kept the difference as
profit. Institutions whose costs exceeded the average price per case, however, were not compensated for
their losses. To complicate matters further, Medicare's new payment system did not adjust reimbursement
rates adequately to account for differences in the severity of patients' injuries.17 18 19 These changes were
particularly difficult for hospitals with a large caseload of trauma patients, for the cost of treating
severely injured patients is often two to four times the average cost of non-trauma admissions as a result
of longer lengths of stay and more frequent use of intensive care units.20 At the same time, hospitals in
many cities saw a dramatic increase in trauma cases as a result of a growing wave of drug related
violence. Combined with the high costs of 24 hour staffing and equipment requirements, inadequate
reimbursement and a growing number of uninsured patients led to significant financial losses for many
trauma centers. As a result, more than 10% of the trauma centers in the US closed between 1983 and
1992, while others continued to pile up red ink.21
Growing concern about the fiscal health of the nation's trauma centers in the late 1980s, coupled
with increased awareness of the importance of injury control after the publication of a second report on
injury by the National Academy of Sciences, led to renewed Congressional interest in improving the
nation's emergency medical services and trauma care system. Congressional hearings on the Trauma Care
Systems Planning and Development Act (S. 15) in 1989 and 1990 attracted strong support from a host of
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health providers, including representatives from the American College of Surgeons (ACS), the American
College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP), and various organizations representing emergency nurses and
allied health professionals. The testimony of surgeons and ER physicians before Congress underscored a
common theme: more than a decade of statistical evidence from across the nation suggested that many
injury related deaths were preventable.22 By directing patients to facilities which met well defined
minimum standards established by the ACS and other national organizations, regional trauma systems
saved lives and improved the quality of care for injured patients.
Since well defined standards of care already existed for trauma patients, the challenge for states
was to coordinate the activities of different groups of providers to create a seamless system of care.
Federal intervention, these providers argued, would help states to develop plans which applied the
lessons learned from existing trauma systems in San Francisco, Orange County, and elsewhere. From
trauma providers' perspective, a new federal planning program would contribute essential seed money to
conduct needs assessments, bring relevant parties together, and create an institutional mechanism to
coordinate care among prehospital providers such as EMTs and air ambulance services, clinics and other
hospitals which lacked the facilities or personnel to treat trauma patients, and specialized trauma centers.
The legislation met the approval of a joint House-Senate conference committee in October 1990.
The passage of Pub. L. 101-590 raised expectations among trauma care providers that federal
intervention would significantly improve the quality of services for injured patients by enabling states to
inventory their patient care resources, assess unmet needs, and develop plans to coordinate services. A
national trauma care advisory council was created to develop a model trauma care system plan which
would outline the crucial elements of an "inclusive" trauma care system within one year. The inclusive
approach to trauma system development embodied in the 1990 legislation reflected a growing consensus
that the planning process should address several distinct, yet related goals, including (1) public

11
education, data collection and evaluation, and injury prevention programs to reduce the incidence of
injury, (2) improved access to care through the development of effective prehospital communications and
emergency 9-1-1 systems; (3) proper training and triage protocols for prehospital personnel; (4) standards
for the designation and classification of health care facilities; (5) the creation of evaluation procedures
and data to monitor the quality of care, and (6) effective linkages with rehabilitation providers to ensure
that injured individuals return to a productive role in society.23 In order to ensure that state plans provide
for "access to the highest possible quality of trauma care" Pub. L. 101-590 required states which received
trauma system planning grants to develop or modify their plans to meet eleven criteria, which reflected
the existing guidelines and standards established by the ACS and ACEP.24
Organizational Barriers to Trauma System Development
All new federal programs must grapple with basic challenges of internal organization and
establishing linkages with other organizations in their environment. In addition, federal policy makers
must devise strategies to implement their goals effectively through state and local agencies.25
Responsibility for implementing Pub .L. 101-590 for the 1992 fiscal year fell to the Health Resources and
Services Administration's Bureau of Health Resources Development (BHRD). BHRD officials
immediately faced a difficult set of choices, for the initial appropriation for the program first year of
operation ($4.3 million) was far short of its authorized level ($60 million) for FY1992. Furthermore, a
careful inspection of both the statutory requirements of Pub. L. 101-590 and the BHRD's application
guidelines suggests that Congress failed to learn from the past in designing the federal government's
latest venture into health planning. In particular, state trauma system planning programs would
encounter substantial difficulties as a result of both the program's statutory requirements and
questionable assumptions about the nature of the health planning process.

12
The BHRD's insistence that state applicants structure their goals and objectives to implement the
goals outlined in its Model Trauma Care System Plan presented an additional challenge for state
applicants. Pub. L. 101-590 required the BHRD to develop a model plan within a year, but a draft of the
plan was not available prior to the first application cycle. Instead, applicants were asked to use the
criteria presented in the National Transportation and Highway Safety Administration's (NHTSA)
Assessment of Emergency Medical Services to assure a consistent format for evaluating applications.
State plans were required to address eleven specific statutory functions, from establishing standards for
trauma center designation to identifying resources for data collection, evaluation, and public education.
The BHRD's emphasis on uniformity reflected its statutory mandate; the eleven criteria contained in the
legislation were not goals, but rather requirements, for states which accepted federal funding to develop
or modify trauma system plans.
A rigid adherence to the federal model trauma care system plan, however, ignores the
considerable variation in both states' needs and priorities for trauma system development. In some states,
participants may regard prehospital communications and training as the most pressing problem, while
others may emphasize data collection, the creation of standards for classifying and/or designating
institutions as trauma centers, or other concerns. By requiring states to simultaneously address a diverse
set of complex issues with limited resources (the largest grants awarded in FY 1992 were below
$300,000) Pub. L. 101-590 reflects a "top-down" approach to health planning.
Although Pub. L. 101-590 was designed as a capacity-building program for state governments,
the matching funds requirements in the enabling legislation discouraged many states from applying for
second and third year grants. Although no matching funds were required for a first year application, in
the second year, states were required to match every federal dollar with two state dollars either in-cash or
in-kind. The matching requirement was intended to extend the pool of funds available as widely as
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possible by shifting much of the fiscal responsibility for the program to the states. Trauma system
development was expected to be a long term process, and Congress expected the states to share in the
cost. In practice, however, the matching requirement presented a significant hurdle for state health
departments reeling from budget cuts and fiscal constraints. The required state contribution increased to
three state dollars for every federal dollar in all subsequent years. States which could not meet the
matching requirements were ineligible to reapply for funding; x states did not reapply for second year
grants.
Deja Vu All Over Again: Facing Up to Political Reality
Trauma system development requires extensive cooperation among a wide range of organizations
with different professional norms, economic interests, and values. The BHRD's model trauma care
system plan exhorts states to forge a consensus for improving the quality of care provided to injured
patients among a diverse group of payers, providers, and consumers.26 While few organizations would
oppose the desirability of the BHRD's long term goal of improving the quality of care for injured
patients, agreeing on the means to achieve the goal, or even the definition of the most significant
problems in a state's present trauma care delivery system is a different matter. The BHRD's model
trauma care system plan emphasized the importance of conducting a systematic needs assessment in
order to assemble data to evaluate the performance of state trauma systems. Implicit in the BHRD's
model trauma plan, however, is the notion that hospitals, EMTs, third party insurers, rehabilitation
providers, and others involved in the care of injured patients will set aside their self interest to cooperate
for the benefit of patients. Data alone, however, is unlikely to foster cooperation among a diverse set of
providers, for trauma system development, and health planning in general, presents policy makers with a
contemporary example of the collective action problem.

14
Regional trauma care systems are public goods which have the potential to impose significant
costs on participating health providers. A trauma system, in other words, confers general benefits on its
surrounding community by specifying operating standards, transfer protocols, mutual aid agreements, and
other cooperative ventures to provide "optimal" care to injured patients. Individual providers, however,
may bear the burden of a systematic approach--some hospitals and physicians may not be designated as
trauma centers, and hence may treat fewer patients, while other hospitals which are designated as trauma
centers may experience increased costs for staffing or a greater volume of uncompensated care for
uninsured patients. While nonprofit hospitals often emphasize their service to the community, institutions
which set aside their own self interest for the common good in the long run may go out of business
altogether. Unless planners recognize the inherent barriers to consensus among participants in the
planning process, they will be hard pressed to transform goals into actual policies.
In recent years, game theory has been used to explain a wide variety of phenomena, from
international arms races to competition among hospitals for patients and physicians.27 The problem of
cooperation is typically described in terms of a "game" between two parties known as the "prisoner's
dilemma." In the classic prisoner's dilemma, two prisoners suspected of having committed a crime are
placed in separate cells by the police. The police have enough evidence to convict each prisoner on a
lesser charge, but nevertheless tell each man that he will be released if he denounces his companion. If
each prisoner implicates the other, both will be jailed, while if neither talks, each will receive a short
sentence. The usefulness of the prisoner's dilemma for analyzing cooperative behavior lies in the
dominant strategy for both players--a rational player will choose to defect and implicate his companion,
even though both will be worse off than if they cooperated and remained silent. Since both players make
their decisions independently without any knowledge of the other's choice, each assumes that the other
will defect and acts accordingly.28
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The Politics of Designation
Trauma system development resembles a prisoner's dilemma in several ways. First, institutions
will weigh the costs and benefits of participating in a regional trauma system. In theory, regionalization
represents a rational solution to the problems of treating severely injured patients by directing trauma
cases to designated facilities that are best equipped to care for them. However, it can be difficult to
convince hospital administrators to participate in such a system. An assessment of state EMS and trauma
care systems in the late 1980s concluded that only Maryland and Virginia had operational trauma care
systems which met the criteria developed by the American College of Surgeons' Committee on Trauma.29
In the absence of a solution to the problems of trauma center reimbursement, few providers are likely
participate, for designation as a trauma center threatens to saddle institutions with an unprofitable mix of
severely injured patients, many of whom lack insurance. While hospitals which treat a small number of
trauma patients may be happy to unload the responsibility of caring for their most expensive, unprofitable
cases onto a regional trauma center, administrators at large teaching hospitals will strive to avoid having
such patients "dumped" at their doorstep.
Other participants may also be reluctant to cooperate in trauma system planning. Outlying
hospitals which are not designated as trauma centers may also be reticent to participate in a regionalized
trauma care system for fear of losing patients or physicians. Although trauma patients are typically not a
major sources of revenue for smaller community hospitals, administrators at non-designated institutions
may fear that patients' perceptions of their institution will change if they no longer treat trauma patients.
Furthermore, hospitals compete with neighboring institutions to attract and retain attending physicians on
their medical staffs30 and the prospect of an exodus of physicians to institutions which treat a larger
percentage of more challenging patients may make administrators hesitant to triage patients elsewhere.
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Furthermore, institutions may be cautious about embracing a regionalized trauma system because
of concerns about how many institutions will be designated and what standards will be used to verify
hospitals' resources and capabilities. Since not all institutions in a geographic area will be designated as
trauma centers, many institutions are concerned about their role in a reformed system. The cost of
attaining and maintaining trauma center designation also constitute a significant barrier to building a
consensus among providers, for the staffing and equipment requirements outlined by the ACS require a
considerable financial commitment from participating institutions. Hospitals which presently serve as de
facto trauma centers, without having to meet ACS standards, may be required to add staff, expand shifts,
or invest in new equipment or technologies in order to retain their designation. Unless existing trauma
centers are "grandfathered" or the standards for designation and/or verification are known in advance,
many hospital administrators will be reluctant to participate in trauma system development. Finally,
enticing third party payers to support trauma system development will also be difficult, for effective
treatment of trauma patients may involve two or more institutions. Modifying existing reimbursement
methodologies to compensate hospitals which stabilize injured patients for transfer to a trauma center, for
example, poses a real challenge for case-based reimbursement systems such as Medicare's PPS, for
insurers will not pay for the same treatment twice. In addition, recent trends in managed care (e.g.,
selective contracting with certain hospitals or integrated service delivery networks) will also affect third
party payers' level of interest, and willingness, to finance trauma system development. Under such
circumstances, how will hospitals share the reimbursement for treating a patient? While cooperation may
be appealing from the perspective of providing "optimal care" to injured patients, the implementation of
effective triage and transfer arrangements depends upon the creation of appropriate financial incentives
for participating providers.
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Studies of cooperation over the past decade suggest at least two possible solutions to the
collective action problem facing health planners. On the one hand, coercive government intervention
through legislation or rule-making offers a means to overcome the collective action problem by forcing
providers, payers, and others to modify their behavior. Political theorists use a variation of this argument
to account for the emergence of governments in the first place. In this view, the creation of coercive state
power will assure the provision of collective goods, for government officials compel all to participate,
even though all parties have an incentive to "free ride" by not pursuing joint action. 31 32 Few providers,
however, are likely to welcome new government regulations which either restrict the types of patients
they can treat or which impose new staffing and equipment requirements on cash-strapped institutions.
Furthermore, the BHRD's model trauma care system plan envisions cooperation, not unilateral
government action, as the catalyst for trauma system development. In light of the obstacles to
cooperation among providers and payers noted above, however, how can planners transform conflict into
cooperation and consensus?
Recent research on negotiation by Robert Axelrod and others emphasizes the importance of
reciprocity and the creation of institutions or norms to ensure continued collaboration among the parties
involved.33 In stark contrast to the coercive approach to solving the collective action problem outlined
above, Axelrod used computer simulations to demonstrate that under certain conditions cooperation
could emerge in "a world of egoists without centralized authority." The conditions required for the
emergence of cooperation are remarkably simple, yet intuitively appealing. The evolution of cooperation
requires participants to interact on more than one occasion. If the parties expect to interact on a regular
basis, reciprocity (e.g., tit for tat) offers the best strategy to improve cooperation among autonomous
actors, for rational individuals (or firms) will base their actions upon the expected behavior of others. If
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other players consistently cooperate, rather than defect, cooperation can emerge as the dominant strategy
for all participants.
Institution-building also offers a viable means to promote cooperation, particularly in cases
where actors may be concerned about the possibility that others are cheating. The establishment of a
regime which specifies either formal rules or informal norms to govern the behavior of all participants
institutionalize patterns of reciprocity. Such arrangements reassure participants because the "regime must
specify what constitutes cooperation and what constitutes cheating, and each actor must be assured of its
own ability to spot others' cheating immediately."34 Reciprocity and institution-building are mutually
reinforcing, rather than competing alternatives for promoting cooperation. Although participants may
initially agree to cooperate on a limited basis on peripheral issues, the successful implementation of a "tit
for tat" strategy can "spill over" to more significant issues over time.
How can the lessons learned from studies of cooperation be applied to trauma system planning?
If key groups view trauma system planning as merely the latest in a series of well-intentioned, but
abortive state and federal initiatives, they are unlikely to commit themselves to the process. How can
state officials encourage a diverse group of hospitals, prehospital providers, third party payers, and other
stakeholders to participate in a collaborative planning process? Recent developments in the study of how
individuals change their behavior offer insights into creating an effective "bottoms-up" approach to
systemwide planning.
A New Approach to Health Planning
As Douglas Cook, the Director of Florida's Agency for Health Care Administration, notes,
"health care reform isn't something that can be imposed from the top down, from the state to the local
level, or necessarily from the federal to the state and local level. You need to accustom people to the
notion that change will take place and that they will have to be a part of it." 35 The first challenge
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planners face in building consensus is enticing organizations to participate in the process. As Cook
notes, "the first essential element of restructuring the system is to gain political consensus that change
needs to take place. That means challenging the status quo in which there's a tremendous amount of
money." Hospitals and other organizations involved in trauma system development, however, may differ
in their willingness to embrace change.
In recent years, new views of how individuals change long standing behaviors highlights a
critical, but often overlooked point for proponents of trauma systems development. The development of
regional trauma systems requires individuals and organizations to abandon long standing practices in the
hope of improving patient care. Enticing hospitals and other organizations to modify their behavior,
however, is not as simple as presenting individuals with data that trauma systems can save lives, for
decision makers are often resistant to change. Despite economists' assumptions to the contrary, hospitals
are not monolithic and are rarely governed by single actors who can act unilaterally; in most institutions,
power exists on many levels. Since the regulatory role of state health departments often places them in
conflict with hospitals and other health providers, the very organizations and individuals whose
cooperation is essential for the success of trauma system development are likely to view state-sponsored
initiatives to regionalize services with caution. One strategy frequently used by participants in health
planning processes is stalling--organizations send representatives who lack decision making authority to
monitor the progress of the planning process, but never fully commit themselves to change. Health
planners must recognize that individuals and institutions vary considerably in their willingness to change
their behavior. Trauma system development does not occur in a vacuum. Proponents of regionalized
trauma care services must recognize that other factors in the political, economic, and organizational
environment can and will change, and that such changes may have widespread repercussions for trauma
system development.
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Prochaska and others have identified several basic stages and processes of change that
individuals progress through as they seek to modify their behavior.36 Individuals progress through several
preparatory stages before adopting a new mode of behavior. Persons who have given little or no thought
to changing their behavior are at a "precontempletion" stage; in order to change such individuals'
behavior, planners must first provide decisionmakers within affected organizations with information
about the problem and its importance. Other individuals have contemplated change, but have not yet
decided to take action. In contrast, other individuals are actively preparing for change by gathering
information and exploring alternatives to their present behavior. Some organizations may change their
behavior without support or prodding from external actors; others need encouragement and support in
order to reach a decision to change. Since individuals' motivations to stay the course also vary, persons
in different circumstances will require differing types and levels of support to maintain their new pattern
of behavior.

The Challenge of Effective Representation
The process of representation in most health planning programs presents an additional barrier to
enticing individuals and organizations to conform to the goals outlined in a comprehensive state plan.
Although committees and other formal planning bodies offer a forum for providers, payers, and
consumers to express their views, the opinions of appointed members are at best an imperfect mirror of a
state's trauma care constituency. Representatives are unable to speak for groups who are not present at
the advisory committee's meetings. Merely including representatives from the hospital industry, for
example, may introduce a hospital's views on trauma system development, but in no way does it insure
adequate representation for the hospital industry in the planning process. The limited size of the most
planning boards means that some institutions will inevitably be left out; excluded groups may challenge
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the legitimacy of the plan, or object to the composition of the membership which drafted it. In short, it is
not enough to merely invite a "representative" sample of organizations; rather, the process should be
designed so that each group feels as if it is a stakeholder which has an opportunity to influence the final
outcome.
For a statewide trauma system plan to have a reasonable chance at successful implementation,
planners must assure that the representatives who participate in the process are authorized to speak for
their institutions. This notion is not as simple as it first appears, for most planning bodies are assembled
by trying to model the demographic characteristics of the surrounding community.37 Participation in the
planning process in no way implies a commitment by an organization to change its behavior. Instead, the
salience of the project can be gauged by organizations' choice of representatives--hospitals, for example,
may send middle managers with no real decision making authority to simply "have someone at the table"
to monitor the behavior of others and to express symbolic support for the goals of the process.
Conversely, projects which are a priority for the institution will attract personnel from the upper layers of
management, who have more authority to speak on behalf of their organizations. While participants' final
decision to commit themselves to the goals outlined in a plan typically must be approved by others (e.g.,
the board of directors or other senior managers), high level participants have greater access to key
decision makers in their organizations. For planning to generate real long term results, it must
incorporate key decision makers within organizations, rather than simply providing a seat at the
bargaining table for interested participants.
This approach marks a departure from traditional approaches to health planning, which have
emphasized grassroots planning and broad based participation rather than forging consensus among key
decision makers. Community input remains an essential component of any successful health planning
program, but plans must win the support of those organizations and individuals who will be called upon
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to implement their recomendations. Unless decision makers in positions of authority in affected
organizations commit themselves to the planning process and endorse the final product, most plans are
destined to collect dust.
A new agenda for trauma system development
Although contemporary planning processes strive to acheive a "balance" between different
groups represented on policy making boards and commissions, merely including a representative from
the state hospital association or one of its member institutions often fails to meet the industry's concerns
about representation, for other institutions may feel excluded from the planning process if they are not
able to send a representative. Furthermore, "peak associations" at the state level (e.g., state hospital
associations and medical societies) rarely possess the authority to bargain with representatives from other
groups and government, in the U.S. such organizations typically lack binding authority to bargain on
behalf of their members. As a result, effective representation in health planning debates must strike a
balance between forging consensus among elites and ensuring grassroots feedback. Successful health
planning programs must create an inclusive process which fosters a sense of ownership for participants.
Persons involved in regional planning must be able to influence the policy preferences of key
decision makers within their organizations, rather than simply reporting on the activities of planning
councils. Planners must create a process which brings together leaders from stakeholder groups who
understand the constraints and possibilities of their organizations' operating environment to air common
concerns in order to identify points of agreement and discuss realistic strategies for implementing goals.
Without a commitment from the leadership of affected organizations, trauma system planning efforts will
fail. Planning, unlike rule-making and regulation, must be a collaborative process, rather than one which
relies on a "command and control" approach in which affected organizations are instructed to conform to
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a model plan. The outlines of a new strategy to reorient contemporary health planning incorporate
lessons learned from studies of behavioral change and the evolution of cooperation.
Stakeholders in trauma system development may vary considerably in their willingness to modify
longstanding patterns of behavior. A planning process which requires all participants to commit
resources or make decisions affecting their organizations by a preestablished deadline ignores the fact
that some groups will be ready to change their organizational routines with little or no external prodding,
while others do not yet recognize the need for change, or if they agree that change is necessary, believe
that while others may need to change their behavior, they do not. In short, planners must work with each
organization's "learning curve" in order to effect change in a voluntary planning process. Recent
experience with "negotiated investment strategies" and other forms of collaborative decision making
offer an institutional mechanism to structure consensus-building efforts in health planning programs.38
Decision making using a negotiated investment strategy (NIS) was pioneered by the Kettering
Foundation of Dayton, Ohio in response to growing dissatisfaction with existing methods of policy
development and program implementation. Implementation of a NIS approach to trauma system planning
would rely upon mediated negotiations among teams of leaders from different levels of government,
health providers, payers, and other affected interests. Similar strategies have been used successfully to
resolve differences over the allocation of federal grant monies and program reductions in Connecticut
during the 1980s. Under a NIS, the "end product" of the negotiations is a written agreement on how to
resolve problems requiring joint action. The NIS approach organizes various participants who do not
have a history of cooperation into distinct negotiating teams, each of which addresses a single component
of the overall problem. As implemented in Connecticut, the NIS approach "envisions the building of
consensus on broad policy issues in a two step process. First, consensus is developed within teams made
up of leaders representing organizations with similar, although by no means indentical, interests and
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constituencies. Then, a consensus is negotiated among teams which ... have conflicting interests and
constituencies and which have seldom or never entered into a similar negotiating situation." 39
To build consensus among groups with different goals and interests, the NIS model relies upon
the services of an impartial mediator to facilitate discussion and identify common ground among
participants. Although participants in an NIS have different economic and political interests, they share
some things in common (e.g., providing high quality care to injured patients). The mediator does not
suggest solutions or impose decisions on participants, but rather encourages organizations to exchange
information and present their concerns before any proposals or goals are drafted. The end result of
protracted, face-to-face negotiations among participants is a written agreement containing mutual
assumptions, commitments, and expectations. After other interested parties have had an opportunity to
comment upon the proposed agreement, it is ratified by each of the participants, who also pledge to
monitor the implementation of stated goals and review the performance of the programs or processes
created by the agreement.
The NIS approach reflects Axelrod's notion of promoting collaboration by encouraging
reciprocity; by defining each organization's interests and concerns, the NIS process aids participants in
identifying common ground. Implicit in the NIS approach is the notion of "spillover" effects. If
organizations can identify possibilities for cooperation in areas which are peripheral, or at least not
central, to their core activities, a pattern of tit for tat may emerge in which success in one area builds
confidence among participants in the prospects for joint problem solving in other areas. Furthermore, by
emphasizing participating organizations' common interests and goals, a NIS approach minimizes the
potential conflicts of interest among different groups. Such a process, however, does not lend itself to
quick solutions; negotiations are likely to be long, and change incremental. The appeal of NIS, however,
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lies in the incremental approach to consensus-building, for it ensures commitment from parties to the
agreement.
Conclusion
In the end, planners must create a new mechanism to forge agreement among a diverse group of
prehospital providers, payers, and hospitals. Such a mechanism must openly acknowledge conflicts of
interest between parties, rather than seeking to create an artificial consensus. An effective planning
process must cope with concerns about the distribution of health care personnel and resources, overcome
resistance from entrenched geographical interests, and replace traditional decision making processes with
more "rational" approaches to caring for treating injured patients. The diffuse benefits of trauma system
development efforts hinder planners' ability to mobilize support for new legislative initiatives or
proposals which would impose new costs or obligations on health providers or payers. Although the
model trauma care system plan and public health plans such as Healthy People 2000 offer detailed
blueprints of state goals and options for achieving them, systemwide planning efforts neglect to consider
the political feasibility of their policy recommendations.
Trauma system planning must promote collaborative problem-solving that is relatively immune
to the uncertainties of competition for federal grant funds and the unpredictability of the state budget
process, for an episodic approach to planning is both ineffective and counterproductive. At best, bursts
of activity followed by periods of inactivity due to budget shortfalls result in unnecessary delays in
implementing programmatic objectives. At worst, however, such a process alienates the very
organizations whose participation is essential for improving the quality of care for injured persons.
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